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 1 
Time Preferences and the Pricing of Complementary Durables and Consumables 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
There is strong empirical evidence that consumers discount at significantly higher rates than firms. 
Yet, most research abstracts from the effect of discount rates on marketing decisions such as pricing. 
We study the effects of a consumers’ discount rate that is higher than a firm’s discount rate on prices, 
profits and consumer surplus of complementary products in four competitive settings and an infinite 
time setting: the firm is a monopolist or competes in the durable market and either ties the consumable 
to the durable or sells untied products. Our analysis yields five main results: First, a higher time 
preference of consumers than the firm never increases the optimal durable price and never decreases 
the optimal consumable price. Second, the optimal consumable price of tied goods is always higher 
than the optimal consumable price of untied goods, whereas the optimal durable price is always higher 
when goods are untied. Third, a higher time preference of consumers than the firm never increases 
profit, always decreases consumer surplus and, as a result, always decreases welfare. Fourth, the 
ability of the firm to commit to future prices and of consumers to commit to future purchases benefits 
both consumers and the firm. Fifth, if the firm competes in the durable market, then tying increases 
consumer surplus when consumers commit to purchasing the consumable. We discuss the 
implications of our results for firms’ pricing strategies. 
 
Keywords: Pricing, Nonlinear pricing, Two-part tariffs, Complementary products, Tied goods, 
Commitment 
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1. Introduction 
Behavioral research in marketing and economics argues that consumers discount future 
benefits and payments at a much higher rate than firms. Annual discount rates for 3-year delays, 
for example, lie in the range of 36% - 46% and for a 1-year delay in the range of 83% - 100% 
(Thaler, 1981; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & 
Bettman, 2009). By contrast, a firm’s weighted average cost of capital, a good indicator of a firm’s 
discount rate, broadly lies in the range of 7% to 12% (KPMG International, 2014). Yet, despite 
strong evidence that consumers discount at higher rates than firms, the effects of differences in 
time preferences of consumers and firms on marketing decisions like pricing, and ultimately on 
profit and welfare, have rarely been studied (Ho, Lim, & Camerer, 2006). 
Consumers’ time preferences influence consumers’ choices when expenditures or benefits 
occur at least partly in the future as opposed to instantaneously. In the case of complementary 
products, such as razors and blades, consumers typically purchase the durable (the razor) today but 
most units of the consumable (the blades) in the future. Likewise, benefits largely arise in the future. 
A firm aiming to set profit-maximizing prices for its durable and consumable therefore needs to 
understand how consumers’ time preferences affect their willingness to pay and hence its prices 
and profit. 
Complementary product strategies are widespread in consumer goods markets. They include 
tied products where the consumable can only be used with the same firm’s durable, such as the 
patented Polaroid cameras in the 1980s that required Polaroid film, Procter & Gamble’s Swiffer 
mops, Brita's water pitcher/filter system, or burglar alarms that require yearly servicing.1 They also 
                                                 
1  We refer to a tie-in when the consumer can use the durable only with the consumable of the same firm. On purchase of the 
durable, the consumer may or may not enter a legally binding contract to later on purchase the consumable. The durable is not 
compatible with the consumable of a competitor and does not provide a benefit in itself. In this sense, complementary products 
are not tied when the consumer can use the durable in conjunction with the consumable of competitors. 
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include open (or untied) systems where the consumer is free to use a competitor’s consumable with 
the firm’s durable, such as the iPod and audio/video files that can be purchased at both the iTunes 
store or elsewhere, or printers and cartridges. 
In this paper, our aim is to analyze how the fact that consumers typically discount future 
expenditures and benefits more strongly than a firm affect optimal prices of complementary 
products, profit, consumer surplus and ultimately welfare in a wide range of settings. We also 
analyze how the firm’s ability to commit to future prices and consumers’ ability to commit to future 
purchases of the consumable impact these results. 
The effect of a higher discount rate of consumers, relative to that of a firm, on profit from 
complementary products is difficult to predict. Intuitively, one might predict that if consumers 
discount later payments at greater rates than the firm, then the firm should increase the consumable 
price (which consumers discount) and decrease the durable price (which is paid immediately). The 
result might be an increase in profit beyond the profit they would obtain if the firm and consumers 
had the same time preferences. However, consumers with higher discount rates will also more 
strongly discount the consumer surplus that comes with the consumption of the consumable. This 
stronger discounting may decrease the present value of the consumer surplus of the consumable, 
forcing the firm to lower the durable price. This example illustrates that the question of how the 
firm should adjust prices when consumers have stronger time preferences than the firm, and how 
these discount rates affect profits, is difficult to answer. 
The literature on complementary products typically argues that tying is disadvantageous for 
consumers (Economides, 2011). Yet, it is less clear that this argument holds when consumers 
discount more strongly than the firm: under tying, the firm is able to more flexibly shift payments 
between current and later periods, and so may be in a better position to respond to changes in 
consumers’ time preferences. 
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We analytically model the effect of time preferences of consumers and the firm on optimal 
prices of complementary products, profit, consumer surplus and welfare. We consider 
heterogeneous demand functions of consumers and explicitly model the infinite-period nature of 
the transactions. The durable is purchased immediately (i.e., in the first period, here denoted as 
period 0) and the consumable in each of the later periods. When consumers purchase the durable, 
they evaluate the payment for the durable and the discounted value of payments and benefits of the 
consumable. 
Methodologically, because of the similarities between two-part tariffs and complementary 
products, we extend the modeling approach typically used for the pricing of two-part tariffs (Oi, 
1971; Png & Wang, 2010) to account for multiple competitive settings and different time 
preferences of consumers and the firm. In doing so, our work contributes to four streams of 
research. 
First, it contributes to research on the pricing of complementary products. This research has 
largely focused on how heterogeneity in consumer tastes affects durable and consumable prices 
(Leland & Meyer, 1976; Emch, 2003), whether firms can use tying to price discriminate between 
consumers (Liebowitz, 1983; Gil & Hartmann, 2009), the effect on prices of a firm’s inability to 
commit to future aftermarket prices (Borenstein, MacKie-Mason, & Netz, 2000), whether firms 
benefit from shrouding add-on prices (Gabaix & Laibson, 2006), or manufacturer/retailer 
interaction in the presence of complementarity products (Hartmann & Nair, 2010). Other work has 
examined why firms offer add-ons, the effect of offering add-ons on firms and consumers (Ellison, 
2005) and the type of inferences consumers draw from the availability of add-ons. But as of yet, 
this research does not account for differential discount rates of firms and consumers and examine 
their impact on profit and consumer surplus. An exception is Heubrandner and Skiera (2010) who 
show that tying products increases welfare if consumers discount more strongly than the firm. Yet, 
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they assume homogeneous demand, use only a two-period setting and do not analyze the effect on 
profit. In sum, research on complementary products provides little insights on how different time 
preferences of consumers and firms affect prices, profit, consumer surplus and welfare. 
Second, our results add to work that has examined how consumers’ discounting and time 
preferences impact prices. Empirically, Oster and Scott Morton (2005) find that magazine 
publishers’ subscription prices reflect consumers’ present bias. Yao, Mela, Chiang, and Chen 
(2012) show that underestimating discount rates can result in suboptimal pricing decisions. Further, 
Dubé, Hitsch, and Jindal (2014) find in data from lab experiments that consumers’ discount rates 
affect their durable goods adoption decisions. Theoretically, Schaaf and Skiera (2014) outline how 
differences in time preferences affect optimal prices of advance selling. Stokey (1979) shows that 
heterogeneity in time preferences makes, under certain conditions, temporal price discrimination a 
profitable strategy. Related, Landsberger and Meilijson (1985) find that intertemporal price 
discrimination can be profitable if consumers discount at higher rates than monopolistic firms. 
Mandy (1991) allows for different time preferences of firms and consumers in the context of two-
part tariffs but abstracts from demand heterogeneity. We add to this literature by extending the 
analysis of time preferences to the pricing of complementary products. 
Third, our work contributes to research on commitment. This research has focused on the firm’s 
ability to commit to prices (e.g., Armstrong, 2006; Desai, Koenigsberg, & Purohit, 2004; Su & 
Zhang, 2008). For example, Armstrong (2006) concludes in a two-period model that a monopolistic 
firm’s inability to commit to its prices damages its profit. Similarly, Taylor (2004) concludes that 
a firm realizes a higher profit if it is able to commit. 
Lastly, our findings add to an ongoing debate on whether firms benefit when consumers’ 
behavior deviates from behavioral assumptions in standard microeconomic models and how firms 
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should then adjust their policies (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004; Lambrecht & Skiera, 2006; Schulz, 
Schlereth, Mazar, & Skiera, 2015). 
2. Set-up of model for pricing complementary products under time preferences 
We first lay out the set-up of our modeling approach. Next, we derive optimal durable and 
consumable prices and the resulting profit, consumer surplus and welfare for a durable market 
monopolist both under tie-in and when the firm does not tie the durable and the consumable but is 
able to commit to consumable prices. We also derive the results that apply if a durable market 
monopolist does not commit to the consumable prices. We then turn to a firm that competes in the 
durable market. We derive optimal prices, profit, consumer surplus and welfare both under tie-in 
and when the firm does not tie the durable and the consumable. Next, we discuss the results when 
consumers who bought the durable do not commit to purchasing the consumable in the future. 
We define complementary products as a combination of a durable and a consumable product 
where the durable is purchased only once, the consumable is purchased multiple times, and neither 
can be used independently of the other. The consumable can be sold by the same firm as the durable, 
or by a competitor. The firm that sells both the consumable and the durable may be able to tie the 
two products so that the consumer can use the durable only with the consumable of the focal firm 
but not with the consumable of a competitor. Firms tie products through product design or contracts 
(Tirole, 1988; Warhit, 1980). We model four competitive settings (CS) depending on whether the 
firm is a monopolist or competes in the durable market and whether or not the consumable is tied 
to the durable (Table 1). 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Methodologically, we build on the pricing of two-part tariffs because of the strong conceptual 
similarities between two-part tariffs and complementary products. In both instances, consumers 
initially purchase the right, or physical option, to use a product and subsequently pay for usage. 
The access price of a two-part tariff corresponds to the price of the durable and the usage price to 
the per-unit price of the consumable. We follow Schmalensee (1981) in assuming a continuous 
distribution of consumer types instead of a discrete number of consumer segments (Oi, 1971). 
We assume that there is an infinite number of time periods 𝑇 (𝑇 = {0, 1, 2, … }). In each period 
𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, a group that includes the same number of new consumers (here called cohort) arrives and 
the firm offers them to purchase the durable (which consumers need to buy once) at price 𝐹𝑡. The 
firm offers the consumable in each period 𝑡 to all customers at price 𝑝𝑡. All consumers have the 
same discount rate but we allow for demand heterogeneity. 
The firm has constant marginal durable cost 𝐾 of zero and constant marginal consumable cost 
𝑘 > 0 for each unit of the consumable.2 As Schmalensee (1981) notes, relaxing the assumption of 
constant consumable cost adds little new insight. Profit from the sale of the durable to a cohort of 
customers in period 𝑡 occurs in the same period 𝑡, and profit from the sale of the consumable occurs 
in periods later than 𝑡 (starting with 𝑡 + 1). The firm has the same discount rate of 𝑖𝑓 in all periods. 
In other words, the firm discounts the payments in 𝑡 at the discount factor (𝑑𝑓)
𝑡
= 1/(1 + 𝑖𝑓)
𝑡
. 
Consequently, the discounted value of a profit at period 0, from a cohort of customers that is 
acquired in period 𝑡, 𝜋𝑡, amounts to: 
                                                 
2  In Section 2 of the Web Appendix, we demonstrate that durable cost larger than zero, 0,K  still continues to support our 
propositions. Only a minor result changes for the CS III. 
 8  
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )

 

  t t t t i t i t if f f
i
d F d d q p p k  
  
(1) 
where 𝑞(𝑝𝑡+𝑖) is the demand function in period 𝑡 + 𝑖. If the firm sells the durable and the 
consumable always at the same prices, 𝐹 and 𝑝, then equation (1) simplifies to:3 
1( )
( ) ( )( )
1

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t
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(2) 
The total profit equals the sum of profits from selling to all cohorts that are acquired in all 
periods 𝑡: 
0


 t
t
   
  
(3) 
Each consumer in a cohort 𝑡′ decides to purchase the complementary product if his discounted 
consumer surplus of buying the durable and consumables is > 0. A consumer who decides to 
purchase the complementary products, first purchases the durable in period 𝑡′, at price 𝐹𝑡′, and 
then a quantity 𝑞(𝑝𝑡) of consumables, at price 𝑝𝑡 in each of the later periods than 𝑡′ (i.e., 𝑡 > 𝑡′). 
A consumer’s demand for consumables is deterministic, 𝑞(𝑝𝑡), and decreases in the 
consumable price, 𝑝𝑡, 𝜕𝑞(𝑝𝑡)/𝜕(𝑝𝑡) < 0. All payments and surplus are discounted by the 
consumers’ discount factor of (𝑑𝑐)
𝑡 = 1/(1 + 𝑖𝑐) 
𝑡. Given prior research on time discounting 
(Frederick et al., 2002), we focus on consumers having higher time preference than firms, 𝑖𝑐 ≥
𝑖𝑓 > 0, and consequently 1 < 𝑑𝑐 ≤ 𝑑𝑓. 
A type parameter of consumer 𝑗 in period 𝑡, 𝜃𝑗
𝑡, captures demand heterogeneity, and follows 
the uniform distribution 𝑓(𝜃𝑗
𝑡), which is bounded by an upper value of 1 and a lower value of 0. 
                                                 
3  Note that ∑ (𝑑𝑓)
𝑖
= 𝑑𝑓/(1 − 𝑑𝑓)
∞
𝑖=1  because 𝑑𝑓 < 1. 
 9  
The demand for consumables, 𝑞(𝑝𝑡, 𝜃𝑗
𝑡), increases in 𝜃𝑗
𝑡 and is assumed to be continuous and 
differentiable, 𝜕𝑞(𝑝𝑡, 𝜃𝑗
𝑡)/𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝑡 > 0. 
It follows that, given a set of prices for the durable and the consumable, consumer surplus 
increases in 𝜃𝑗
𝑡 and consumers’ demand functions do not intersect. The assumption of non-
intersecting demand functions avoids multiple solutions for the type parameter of the marginal 
consumer, 𝜃𝑀
𝑡  (Goldman, Leland, & Sibley, 1984). The marginal consumer is the consumer with a 
consumer surplus of 0 and is indifferent between buying and not buying the durable and the 
consumable. All consumers 𝑗 in period 𝑡 with a type parameter 𝜃𝑗
𝑡 below 𝜃𝑀
𝑡  do not realize a 
positive discounted consumer surplus, (𝑆𝑗
𝑡(. ) < 0 for 𝜃𝑗
𝑡 < 𝜃𝑀
𝑡 ), and purchase neither the durable 
nor the consumable. The remaining consumers in the same period 𝑡 have a positive discounted 
consumer surplus, (𝑆𝑗
𝑡(. ) ≥ 0 for 𝜃𝑗
𝑡 ≥ 𝜃𝑀
𝑡 ) and purchase the complementary products (see 
equation (4)). We refer to them as customers. 
 
    
    
1
1
( ) ( ) , , 0
, ,
( ) ( ) , , 0

    


    

  
     
  
 
        


t i t i t i t t i t i t t i t t t
c c j j j j j M
it t t t
j j
t i t i t i t t i t i t t i t t t
c c j j j j j M
i
d d WTP p q p p F if
S p F
d d WTP p q p p F if
   

   
 (4) 
Thereby, 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑀
𝑡+𝑖 is the willingness-to-pay of the marginal consumer in period 𝑡 + 𝑖. In line 
with Schmalensee (1981) and Leland and Meyer (1976) we ignore income effects. Thus, the 
optimal price of the durable equals the discounted consumer surplus of the marginal consumer 
before subtracting durable cost. 
The following (multiplicative) demand function for consumables satisfies necessary conditions 
(𝜕𝑞(𝑝𝑡, 𝜃𝑗
𝑡)/𝜕𝑝𝑡 < 0 and 𝜕𝑞(𝑝𝑡, 𝜃𝑗
𝑡)/𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝑡 > 0):  
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  22 ( ))
,
(
, 0  
t t
t t t
t
p
p b b
q p b
 
  (5) 
It has a constant price elasticity of -2, which is in the range of the price elasticities of the two 
meta-analytical studies (Tellis (1988) finds an average price elasticity of -1.76 and Bijmolt, van 
Heerde, and Pieters (2005) a value of -2.62). The multiplicative demand function in equation (5) 
decreases with respect to price (𝜕𝑞(𝑝𝑡, 𝜃𝑗
𝑡)/𝜕𝑝𝑡 < 0), meaning that a higher consumable price 
leads to a lower demand for the consumable. 
The type parameter of consumers (𝜃𝑗
𝑡) in equation (5) allows for capturing heterogeneity in 
demand functions of consumers. It shifts the demand curve for the respective consumer along the 
demand (𝑞) axis (𝜕𝑞(𝑝𝑡, 𝜃𝑗
𝑡)/𝜕𝜃𝑗
𝑡 = 1/(𝑝𝑡)2𝑏). One can think of 𝜃𝑗
𝑡 as an index for consumers 
with different tastes or incomes (Leland & Meyer, 1976). Further, the constant 𝑏 > 0 allows for 
capturing the effects of all factors other than price and the type parameter of consumers that may 
shift demand. 
This demand function leads to the following discounted profit function (𝜋𝑡) for the cohort of 
customers in 𝑡 that reflects the net present value of the profit realized from period 𝑡 onward: 
   
1
1
2
( , ) ( ) ,
(
)
)
(




   
     
    

t
M
t t t t t t t i t i
M f M f t i
i
p d F p d p k d
p b

 

   (6) 
We assume that the firm announces that it charges the same durable and consumable prices 
across all periods 𝑡. Therefore, we continue with 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝 and 𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹. As a result, the marginal 
consumer also remains the same across all periods so that 𝜃𝑀
𝑡 = 𝜃𝑀. Furthermore, we assume that 
consumers have complete information, for example, that they know the firm’s profit function. Note 
that we will also analyze what happens if the firm does not (or cannot) commit to these (constant) 
prices. 
Assuming 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝, 𝐹𝑡 = 𝐹, and 𝜃𝑀
𝑡 = 𝜃𝑀, equation (6) can be written as: 
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The respective discounted consumer surplus (𝑆𝑡) is then: 
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We sum up discounted profit (equation (7)) and discounted consumer surplus (equation (8)) to 
obtain the respective discounted welfare (𝑊𝑡): 
   
 2
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The total profit (𝜋) is derived by summing the profit across all periods that is realized from 
each cohort of customers in period 𝑡 (equation (6)). Likewise, we derive total consumer surplus 
(𝑆), and total welfare (𝑊) by summing across all cohorts of customers in all periods 𝑡 (equations 
(8) and (9) respectively). 
Next, we determine the optimal prices for durable and consumables, profit, consumer surplus 
and welfare in four different competitive settings. For ease of exposition we will omit the term 
‘discounted’ when referring to profit (𝜋𝑡), consumer surplus (𝑆𝑡), or welfare (𝑊𝑡). 
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3. Durable market monopolist 
3.1. Tie-in between durable and consumable – CS I 
In this section we determine how the consumers’ discount rate affects the optimal durable price, 
consumable price, profit, consumer surplus, and welfare for a monopolist in the durable market 
that ties the consumable to the durable (e.g. Polaroid cameras and film in the 1980s). First, we 
discuss the results under the assumption that the firm commits to prices. Then, we discuss how the 
results change when the firm does not (or cannot) commit to prices. 
3.1.1. Optimal prices under price commitment 
A commitment device that allows a firm to lock itself into a course of action (Dubner & Levitt, 
2007), such as future prices, can be externally (e.g., a written contract, public policy makers, 
regulators) or internally (e.g., firm’s brand value, risk of losing brand image in other product 
categories). As a result of such a commitment, the durable and consumable prices always remain 
the same over time. Given that the prices do not change and the same number of consumers arrive 
in each period, it is sufficient to derive the optimal prices for one period. We do so for period 0. 
The profit from selling durable in period 0 and consumables in later periods to the customers 
of period 0 is: 
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𝐹𝐼 is the durable price in CS I (the Greek numbers in subscript represent the CSs across our 
results) and 𝑝𝐼 is the consumable price which the firm sets in period 0 for all later periods (periods 
1, 2, …). 𝜃𝑀,𝐼 is the type parameter of the marginal consumer in CS I. For the marginal consumer, 
consumer surplus (𝑆0) is zero. Thus, the durable price, 𝐹𝐼, equals the consumer surplus before 
paying the durable price: 
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Solving equation (11) for the type parameter yields: 
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Inserting equation (12) into the profit function (equation (10)) and rearranging leads to: 
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Solving the first-order conditions of equation (13) with respect to 𝐹𝐼 and 𝑝𝐼 leads to the optimal 
prices (for details see Section 1.2.1 of the Web Appendix): 
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Inserting the optimal durable and consumable price into equations (12), (7), (8), and (9) gives 
the marginal type parameter, profit, consumer surplus and welfare. Table 2, Column (1) 
summarizes the solutions corresponding to CS I for the cohort of customers in period 0 (the results 
for other cohorts are the same) and Column (2) displays how the results simplify (for details see 
Section 1.2.1 of the Web Appendix) when the firm and consumers have the same discount factor 
(𝑑𝑓 = 𝑑𝑐 = 𝑑). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Under the assumption that the firm commits to the future consumable price, consumable price 
(𝑝𝐼), durable price (𝐹𝐼), and the marginal consumer (𝜃𝑀,𝐼) in all later periods (periods 1, 2, …) 
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remain the same so that equations (12)-(15) also hold for cohorts of new customers in periods other 
than 𝑡 = 0. Thus the (discounted) profit of all cohorts of customers, called total profit, is: 
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Similarly, total (discounted) consumer surplus is: 
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and total (discounted) welfare is the sum of equations (16) and (17). 
We derive the effect of consumers discounting at a higher rate than the firm on prices, profit, 
consumer surplus and welfare in the Web Appendix (see Section 1.2.1). This results in large 
equations that are difficult to interpret. Here, we numerically illustrate the effect of a higher 
consumers’ discount rate on prices, profit, consumer surplus and welfare for the cohort of 
customers in period 0. Figure 1 presents the results for a value of 𝑑𝑓 = .9; other values lead to 
similar results. It shows that an increase in consumers’ discount rate (and thus a decrease in 𝑑𝑐) 
leads to a lower optimal durable price, which becomes zero (if 𝑖𝑐 is very large and, consequently, 
𝑑𝑐 approaches zero). These insights lead us to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1: If the firm is a durable market monopolist who commits to its prices and ties 
the consumable to the durable (CS I), then a higher time preference of consumers than of the firm 
leads to a higher optimal consumable price (𝑝𝐼) and a lower optimal durable price (𝐹𝐼). 
Proposition 2: If the firm is a durable market monopolist who commits to its prices and ties 
the consumable to the durable (CS I), then a higher time preference of consumers than of the firm 
leads to a lower profit and consumer surplus, and consequently welfare. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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Intuitively, higher discounting by consumers diminishes the present value of their surplus from 
the consumable and hence consumers’ willingness to pay for the durable. Since consumers discount 
the payments for the consumable but not the payments for the durable, the firm responds by 
decreasing the durable price and raising the consumable price. This strategy is optimal as long as 
the firm’s discount rate is lower than consumers’ discount rates. Yet, substituting payments for the 
durable with payments for the consumable will never fully compensate for the loss in profit. 
Further, a higher discount rate of consumers, relative to that of the firm, always decreases consumer 
surplus, because consumers benefit less from the (future) consumption of the consumable. Even a 
decrease in the durable price cannot compensate for this loss of consumer surplus. Put differently, 
a firm does not benefit from a higher time preference of consumers since they then value future 
benefits less. 
3.1.2. Optimal prices under no price commitment 
We now look at the case in which the firm does not (or cannot) commit to its future prices. 
This lack of commitment forces consumers to consider the firm’s incentive to change prices. In our 
case, customers are paying a certain durable price immediately because they are expecting a 
(discounted) consumer surplus from their (deterministic) buying of the consumable at a certain 
price in the future. Thus, the firm has an incentive to raise the consumable price after customers 
paid for the durable because customers need to consider this payment as sunk cost. Yet, as the 
consumable price is the same for existing and new customers, an increase in the consumable price 
needs to be accompanied by a decrease in the durable price for all new customers. This new 
combination of durable and consumable prices, however, yields a lower profit than the previous 
combination. Therefore, the firm needs to trade-off between an increase in profit with all existing 
customers and a decrease in profit with all new (i.e., future) customers. 
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Our analysis provides the following results (for details see the Web Appendix, Section 1.2.2.2). 
First, the firm has an incentive to deviate from its announced prices after a certain number of 
customers bought the durable. The underlying reason is that the present value of the loss in profit 
from all future customers is lower (at the point in time at which prices change) than the present 
value of the additional profit that is realized from selling the consumable at higher price to all 
existing customers. 
Second, the firm only deviates once. The intuition behind this result is that consumers only 
trust the firm until it starts to deviate from its announced prices because they were announced as 
being the same across all periods. Thus, the firm knows that if it deviates from its announced prices, 
then consumers will no longer trust the firm and consumers will always expect that the firm will 
charge the durable and consumable prices that provides the firm with the highest profit (called final 
prices, hereafter). Thus, there are only two sets of prices that the firm considers: prices before and 
after the deviation (announced and final prices, respectively). 
Third, consumers (as they have complete information) recognize that the firm will deviate from 
its announced prices and will therefore only purchase if the firm charges the final prices. Thus, the 
durable price and the consumable price will be the same (equal to final prices) in all periods and 
consequently also profit, consumer surplus and welfare will remain the same. 
Table 3, Column (1) describes the solutions and Column (2) displays how the results simplify 
if the firm and consumers have the same discount factor 𝑑𝑓 = 𝑑𝑐 = 𝑑 (for more details see Section 
1.2.2.2 of the Web Appendix). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We again numerically illustrate the effect of consumers discounting at a higher rate than firms 
on prices, profit, consumer surplus and welfare for all customers in period 0 (all other cohorts are 
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comparable so that results will be similar for them). Figure 2 presents the results for a value of 𝑑𝑓 
= .9 (other values lead to similar results). Propositions 1 and 2 hold, except for the consumable 
price, which remains constant. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
We additionally find that if the firm does not commit to its prices, the consumable price is 
higher and the durable price, profit, consumer surplus, and consequently welfare are lower than if 
the firm commits to its prices (for details see Section 1.4 of the Web Appendix). This insight leads 
us to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: If the firm is a durable market monopolist and ties the consumable to the 
durable (CS I), then profit, consumer surplus, and welfare are lower if the firm does not commit to 
its prices than if it commits to its prices. 
3.2. No tie-in between durable and consumable – CS II 
We now consider the case where the durable market monopolist does not tie its durable and 
consumables but competes in the consumable market (e.g. iPod and audio/video files). Thus, the 
firm has to charge the consumable price of its competitors, otherwise the consumers would replace 
the firm’s consumable with other consumables available in the market. As a result, the firm will 
always sell the consumable at its cost, 𝑝𝐼𝐼 = 𝑘. Competition also guarantees that the firm will never 
deviate from this price so that the firm always commits. Thus, prices do not vary across periods. 
The profit function (equation (6)) simplifies to: 
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As the consumer surplus of the marginal consumer is zero, the type parameter of the marginal 
consumer is: 
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Substituting equation (19) into equation (18) and solving the first-order condition yields: 
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Column (1) in Table 4 summarizes the results of CS II (for details see Section 1.2.3 of the Web 
Appendix). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Column (2) displays how the results simplify when the firm and consumers have the same 
discount factor (𝑑𝑓 = 𝑑𝑐 = 𝑑). These results lead us to the following propositions: 
Proposition 4: If the firm is a durable market monopolist but does not tie the consumable to 
the durable (CS II), then a higher time preference of consumers than of the firm does not affect the 
optimal consumable price (𝑝𝐼𝐼) but decreases the optimal durable price (𝐹𝐼𝐼). 
Proposition 5: If the firm is a durable market monopolist but does not tie the consumable to 
the durable (CS II), then a higher time preference of consumers than of the firm decreases profit 
and consumer surplus, and consequently welfare. 
The intuition is similar to that for CS I. Since the value of consumer surplus in later periods is 
greater than the value of the consumer’s expenditures in those periods, each consumer’s “loss” 
from discounting surplus at a higher rate is greater than the “gain” from discounting the payments 
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for the consumable. The firm therefore needs to lower the durable price but, unlike in CS I, it cannot 
increase the consumable price because it competes in the consumable market. Thus, an increase in 
the consumers’ discount rate will always hurt the profit of a durable market monopolist. 
We also compare the profit and consumer surplus of CS I when the firm does not commit to 
the consumable price with those of CS II (see the respective cells in Column (1) of Table 3 and 
Table 4). Equations (21) and (22) show that the difference in discount rates between consumers 
and the firm impacts the difference in profit. If the consumers’ discount rate is much higher than 
that of the firm (𝑑𝑐 ≪ 𝑑𝑓), then both, the firm and consumers are better off when the firm ties the 
consumable to the durable (for more details see Sections 1.4.4 and 1.4.6 of the Web Appendix). 
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This insight yields the following proposition: 
Proposition 6: If the firm is a durable market monopolist, does not commit to its prices, and 
consumers’ time preference is much higher than the firm’s time preference, then profit, consumer 
surplus, and consequently welfare are higher if the firm ties the consumable to the durable. 
4. Competition in the durable market 
4.1. Tie-in between durable and consumable – CS III 
We turn to a firm that competes in the durable market and ties the consumable to the durable 
(e.g., most razor/blade systems). First, we discuss the results under the assumption that the 
customers commit to purchase (i) only one durable and (ii) the consumable in later periods. We 
call this kind of commitment purchase commitment. Then, we discuss how the results change if 
the customers do not (or cannot) make this purchase commitment. 
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4.1.1. Optimal prices under purchase commitment 
Since multiple firms offer a durable that is tied to their consumable, profit under perfect 
competition is zero. Hence, we maximize consumer surplus, equation (8), under the constraint that 
profit (in equation (6)) is zero (Mandy 1991). Rearranging and simplifying equation (6) (that is set 
to zero) yields the following optimal durable price, 𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼 in all periods 𝑡 (for details see Section 1.3.1 
of the Web Appendix): 
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Substituting equation (23) into consumer surplus (for cohort of customers in period 0) in 
equation (8) yields: 
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Solving the system of equations with the first-order conditions of equation (24) with respect to 
𝜃𝑀,𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼 yields: 
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Inserting equations (25) and (26) in equation (23) leads to the optimal durable price, 𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼, which 
is negative because consumers discount more strongly than the firm. One example for firms giving 
away the durable below cost are mobile phone contracts where the customer purchases the durable 
below cost and is locked in over the period of a contract. 
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Column (3) in Table 4 summarizes consumer surplus, profit, and welfare for CS III for all new 
customers in period 0. Since competition in the durable market forces profit to zero, consumer 
surplus, 𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑡 , equals welfare, 𝑊𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑡 . Column (4) displays the results if consumers and the firm have 
the same discount factor (𝑑𝑓 = 𝑑𝑐 = 𝑑). 
The negative durable price leads to a high consumable price, which the firm cannot further 
increase because the consumers did not pay for the durable and consumers are, consequently, not 
“locked-in”. Therefore, the firm will not deviate from its announced consumable price. These 
results yield the following propositions (for details see Section 1.3.1 of the Web Appendix): 
Proposition 7: If the firm competes in the durable market, ties the consumable to the durable 
and customers commit to purchasing the consumable (CS III), then a higher time preference of 
consumers than of the firm leads to a higher optimal consumable price (𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼) and a lower optimal 
durable price (𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼). 
A higher time preference of consumers, relative to the firm’s time preference, makes paying 
higher consumable prices in the future more attractive than paying higher durable prices today. By 
implication, consumers put less emphasis on the consumable price relative to the durable price. 
Thus, as a result of higher time preference of consumers, than of the firm, the consumable price 
increases and the durable price decreases. Similar to CS I, the firm therefore ‘subsidizes’ lower 
payments from the durable with higher payments from the consumable. 
Proposition 8: If the firm competes in the durable market, ties the consumable to the durable 
and customers commit to purchasing the consumable (CS III), then a higher time preference of 
consumers than of the firm decreases consumer surplus, and consequently welfare. 
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Again, the effect of a higher time preference of consumers on consumer surplus is similar to 
CS I though we now have zero profits. Intuitively, a higher time preference of consumers than of 
the firm always decreases consumer surplus because consumers benefit less from the (future) 
consumption of the consumable. Even a decrease in the (negative) durable price cannot compensate 
for this loss of consumer surplus. 
4.1.2. Optimal prices under no purchase commitment 
The purchase commitment of consumers is not required as long as the durable price is not 
negative such as in CS I, CS II, and CS IV. In CS III, however, the purchase commitment is required 
because it allows the firm to sell one unit of the durable at a loss and ‘subsidize’ it with higher 
consumable prices. Otherwise, a negative durable price is no longer feasible because customers 
could just “purchase” the durable i.e., get the durable (or even worse, multiple units of the durable) 
and the money, and walk away without purchasing the consumable. As a result, the firm would not 
charge a negative durable price but instead set the durable price to zero and, consequently, set the 
consumable price to 𝑘, which is the solution that we derive for CS IV (see Section 4.2). This new 
combination of prices (i.e., the durable price of zero and the consumable price of 𝑘), however, 
yields lower consumer surplus than the consumer surplus when consumers commit to purchase. 
The reason is that consumers no longer benefit from a (negative) durable price and even a decrease 
in the consumable price (from 𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼 to 𝑘) cannot compensate for the loss in their consumer surplus. 
This insight yields the following proposition: 
Proposition 9: If the firm competes in the durable market and ties the consumable to the 
durable (CS III), then consumer surplus, and welfare are lower if consumers do not commit to 
purchase the consumable. 
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4.2. No tie-in between durable and consumable – CS IV 
When the firm’s durable is compatible with other firms’ consumables (as in the case, for 
example, with Samsung’s SD cards for its digital cameras), the firm offers both consumables and 
durable at marginal costs in all periods and cannot deviate from those announced prices: 
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Consequently, profit is zero and consumer surplus for all new customers in each period 𝑡 is: 
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Durable cost of zero leads to the type parameter of the marginal consumer: 
, 0M IV  (31) 
Column (5) in Table 4 summarizes the results with respect to consumer surplus, profit, and 
welfare for all customers in period 0. Column (6) displays results if consumers and the firm 
discount at the same rate (for details see Section 1.3.2 of the Web Appendix). Competition in the 
consumable market also guarantees that the customers commit to purchasing the consumable in the 
future. This result leads us to the following proposition: 
Proposition 10: If the firm competes in the durable market and does not tie the consumable to 
the durable (CS IV), then an increase in time preference of consumers has no impact on prices and 
profit, but decreases present value of consumer surplus, and consequently welfare. 
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Again, the effect of a higher time preference of consumers on consumer surplus is similar to 
CS III (when consumers commit to purchase), though the consumer surplus in CS IV is always 
lower. In CS III, when consumers discount at a higher rate than the firm, the firm can ‘subsidize’ 
lower payments from the durable with higher payments from the consumable to partly compensate 
the loss in the consumer surplus (when consumers commit to purchase). However, in CS IV, due 
to competition in both markets (which results in fixed prices for durable and consumable), this 
strategy is not feasible. 
5. Summary of results 
5.1. Summary of effects of differences in time preferences 
Table 5 compares the relative size of variables across competitive settings when consumers 
have higher time preference than the firm. The durable price is highest when the firm only has a 
monopoly in the durable market (CS II), while the consumable price is highest when the firm has 
a monopoly in both markets (CS I). Further, the optimal consumable price of tied goods is always 
higher than the optimal consumable price of untied goods, while the opposite holds for the durable 
price. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In addition, Table 5 outlines that if consumers discount at much higher rates than the firm, then 
profit is highest when the firm has a monopoly in both markets (CS I) and commits to future 
consumable prices. Additionally, we find that tying never decreases profit. If the firm competes in 
the durable market, profit is always zero and neither consumers’ commitment to purchase nor tying 
affects profit. 
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Further, Table 5 illustrates that consumer surplus is highest when the firm competes in the 
durable market. In this case, tying does not decrease consumer surplus. Welfare is highest in CS 
III when consumers commit to purchase. 
5.2. Summary of effects of commitment 
We showed that two kinds of commitment are possible: the firm may commit to its prices (price 
commitment) and consumers may commit to their future purchases (purchase commitment). In line 
with previous literature, the results of Table 5 (compare Columns (1) and (2), respectively Columns 
(4) and (5)) show that everyone is better off if commitment occurs. Thus, commitment never 
decreases profit, consumer surplus, and welfare. 
Commitment, however, is not relevant in all competitive settings. Price commitment is only 
important when the firm has a monopoly in both markets (CS I) and can set a consumable price 
higher than its cost. Purchase commitment matters in CS III. Again, the firm can deviate from a 
consumable price that is equal to its cost. More precisely, we find that if the firm does not (or 
cannot) commit to its prices, then the durable price decreases and the consumable price increases. 
In contrast, if consumers cannot commit to their future purchases of the consumable, then the 
durable price increases and the consumable price decreases. 
Profit increases in case of a firm’s commitment to its future consumable prices because the 
consumers otherwise do not trust that the firm will stick to its announced prices and do not buy 
until the firm charges prices from which it has no incentive to deviate. The crucial question is, 
however, whether the firm is able to commit. In many situations, it is unlikely that the firm has a 
commitment device such as a regulator who may enforce constant prices. As a result, both the firm 
and consumers will be worse off. 
A purchase commitment from consumers in CS III incentivizes the firm to sell the durable at 
a negative price. Such a negative durable price is attractive because consumers discount more 
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strongly than the firm so that the firm has an incentive to essentially provide the consumer with a 
loan. We mention as one example of firms giving away a durable below cost and consumers 
committing to future purchases mobile phones and associated contracts. Note that purchasing 
consumables in the future essentially means that the consumer pays back the loan. If consumers 
cannot commit, then they suffer because the firm will not be able to offer such a loan. Instead, they 
charge a higher (non-negative) durable price and a lower consumable price, which, however, lead 
to a lower consumer surplus and welfare. 
5.3. Summary of effects of tying 
Intuitively, one may expect that tying benefits firms but not customers and that tying increases 
profit but decreases consumer surplus (Economides, 2011). Interestingly, however, if the time 
preference of consumers is higher than the firm’s time preference, the results are not necessarily in 
line with this intuition. For example, we find that consumer surplus never decreases if the firm ties 
the durable to the consumable (compare in Table 5 the relative size of consumer surplus in Columns 
(1)/(2) with (3) and in Columns (4)/(5) with Column (6)). The reason is that tying enables the 
consumer and the firm to sign a long-term commitment contract that allows both parties to benefit 
from the difference in time preferences. 
5.4. Summary of effects of higher time preferences of consumers 
Table 6 summarizes the effect of higher time preference of consumers, relative to those of a 
firm, on profit, consumer surplus and prices across the different competitive settings. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 shows that a higher time preference of consumers than the firm never increases the 
optimal durable price and never decreases the optimal consumable price. Put differently, the 
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optimal durable price decreases with an increase in time preference of consumers, unless the firm 
competes in both the durable and consumable markets or consumers do not commit to purchase the 
consumable. The optimal consumable price increases as long as the firm commits to its prices and 
ties the durable and the consumable. 
Table 6 also indicates that a higher time preference of consumers than of the firm never 
increases profit, always decreases consumer surplus and, as a result, always decreases welfare. This 
finding is important because it outlines that both firms and public policy decision makers have an 
incentive to work towards reducing high time preferences of consumers. 
Table 6 shows that a higher consumers’ discount rate decreases profit unless the firm competes 
in the durable market. The reason for this decrease in profit is that even though the firm benefits 
from a higher discount rate of customers by charging a higher (future) consumable price, the firm 
also has to lower the durable price because customers discount so strongly. The loss in profit 
because of this decrease in durable price is higher than the increase in profit from the higher 
consumable price. 
6. Conclusion 
There is strong empirical evidence that consumers discount at significantly higher rates than 
firms. Yet, most research abstracts from the effect of discount rates on marketing decisions, such 
as pricing. In this research, we examine how the fact that consumers discount at a higher rate than 
the firm affects the pricing of complementary products as well as the resulting profit, consumer 
surplus and welfare. We separately analyze four competitive settings depending on whether the 
firm is a monopolist or competes in the durable market and whether the consumable is tied to the 
durable or not. 
We find that if consumers discount at greater rate than the firm, then the optimal durable price 
never increases and the optimal consumable price never decreases. Further, the optimal consumable 
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price of tied goods is always higher than the optimal consumable price of untied goods, while the 
opposite holds for the durable. These findings mean that firms need to carefully assess consumers’ 
time preferences when setting prices for complementary products. Prior research suggests that such 
time preferences may differ across time horizons and, potentially, products (Winer, 1997; 
Zauberman et al., 2009). 
We find that when consumers discount at a greater rate than the firm, then profit never 
increases, consumer surplus always decreases and, as a result, welfare always decreases. Therefore, 
a firm may, for example, invest into marketing campaigns that try to decrease time preferences of 
consumers by highlighting the value of consumption opportunities. 
We also find that both, price commitment by firms and purchase commitment by consumers 
never decrease profit, consumer surplus, and consequently welfare. 
Further, we show that if consumers discount at higher rates than the firm, then consumers can 
even benefit from tying. This finding goes against the conventional wisdom that tie-in is 
disadvantageous for consumers. For example, public policy makers concerned about consumer 
welfare have in the past attempted to promote legislation that makes tying more difficult (Posner 
and Easterbrook 1981). The reason for this result is that tying enables consumers and the firm to 
sign a long-term commitment contract so that the firm can essentially provide the consumers with 
a loan. Interestingly, the ability to increase consumer surplus is not limited to products that can be 
“physically tied” such as razor and razorblades, but also holds for independent products that might 
be tied via contracts. Thus, our other main result may also explain the popularity of contracts that 
allow for subsidizing the initial purchase, such as for mobile phones: for example in contracts with 
“sim lock” cellphones, the firm subsidizes the phone but is later compensated through greater 
contractual payments for the phone service. 
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To conclude, there are some limitations to our findings that presents opportunities for future 
research. First, our multiplicative demand function does not allow for a consumable price of zero. 
Second, even though we assume consumers are heterogeneous in their tastes, we assume they have 
the same time preference. Third, we assume that the firm announces consumable and durable prices 
that are the same across all periods. An alternative would be the announcement of a price path. 
Finally, we do not allow for collusion and price coordination among firms, which might yield 
different insights than the levels of competition that we consider (monopoly and perfect 
competition). 
In sum, our research demonstrates that consumers’ time preference can have a significant 
impact on a firm’s pricing decisions, profit and welfare. As such, they suggest that the consideration 
of consumers’ time preferences should play a more prominent role in a firm’s marketing decisions. 
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Table 1: Summary of Competitive Settings (CS) 
 Tie-in between durable and consumable 
 Yes No 
Monopolist in the durable market CS I CS II 
Competition in the durable market CS III CS IV 
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Table 2: Summary of Results for Competitive Setting I (CS I) under Price Commitment 
 (1) (2) 
 CSI
(0 1)  c fd d
 
CSI
( ) f cd d d
 
Durable 
price 
( ( 4 5 ) ( 2 ( 1 3 ) )( 10 ( 1 11 ) ) )
22 ( 1 )
            
 
d d d d d d d d d d
c f c f c c f c c f
bk d d
c f
 ( 33 5)
2 (1 )


d
b d k
 
Consumable 
price 
4 ( 1 )
3 ( 6 9 ) ( 2 ( 1 3 ) )( 10 ( 1 11 ) )
 
            
k d d
c f
d d d d d d d d d
f c f c c f c c f
 ( 33 9)
12
 k  
Marginal 
consumer 
( ( 2 3 ))( ( 10 11 ))1
2 2 ( 4 6 )
        
  
     
f c f f c f
f c f
d d d d d d
d d d
 ( 33 3)
6

 
Profit 
2 (44 ( 104 59 )) ( ( 2 ( 1 3 ) )( 10 ( 1 11 ) ) ) ( 10 ( ( 2 3 ))( ( 10 11 )) (16 14 11 ( 2 ( 1 3 ) )( 10 ( 1 11 ) ) ))
216 ( 1 ) ( 1 )
                                 
   
d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d
c f f f f c c f c c f c f c f f c f f f c c f c c f
bk d d d
c f f
 (11 33 59)
16 (1 )


d
b d k
 
Consumer 
surplus 
( 3 ( 6 9 ) ( 2 ( 1 3 ) )( 10 ( 1 11 ) ) )( 5 ( 14 19 ) 3 ( 2 ( 1 3 ) )( 10 ( 1 11 ) ) )
216 ( 1 ) ( ( 2 3 ))
                         

     
d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d
c f c f c c f c c f f c f c c f c c f
bk d d d d d
c f f c f
 (135 23 33)
24 (1 )


d
bk d
 
Welfare 
2( 3 ( 6 9 ) ( 2 ( 1 3 ) )( 10 ( 1 11 ) ) ) 2
( ( 2 3 )( 4 5 ) ( ( 2 ( 1 3 ) )( 10 ( 1 11 ) ) ) ( 6 8 ( 2 ( 1 3 ) )( 10 ( 1 11
2 264 ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( (2 3 ) )
            
                          
     
f c f c c f c c fd d d d d d d d d
d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d dc f f f f c f fc c f c c f c c f c
bk d d d d d d
c f f c f f
) ) ))d
c f
 (93 13 33)
48 (1 )


d
bk d
 
𝑑𝑐 = 1/(1 + 𝑖𝑐), where 𝑖𝑐 is the consumers’ discount rate and 𝑑𝑐 is the consumers’ discount factor; 𝑑𝑓 = 1/(1 + 𝑖𝑓), where 𝑖𝑓 is firm’s discount rate and 𝑑𝑓 is firm’s discount factor;  
CS I represents the competitive setting 1; profit, consumer surplus, and welfare corresponds to cohort of customers in period 0. 
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Table 3: Summary of Results for Competitive Setting (CS I) under No Price Commitment 
 (1) (2) 
 CSI
(0 1)  c fd d
 
CSI
( ) f cd d d
 
Durable price 
2 (1 )
(1 )( (5 4))

  
d d
c f
bk d d d d
c f c f
 
5 (1 )
d
bk d
 
Consumable price 
2k  2k  
Marginal consumer 
2 (1 )
(5 4)


d d
c f
d d d
f c f
 2
5
 
Profit 
2( (2 3 ) )
8 (1 )(1 )( (5 4) )
 

   
d d d
c f f
bk d d d d d
c f c f f
 9
40 (1 )
d
bk d
 
Consumer surplus 
2( (2 3 ) )
24 (1 )( (4 5 ) )
 
  
d d d d
c c f f
bk d d d d
c c f f
 9
100 (1 )
d
bk d
 
Welfare 
2( (2 3 ) ) ( (7 6) )
28 (1 )(1 )( (4 5 ) )
   

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d d d d d d
c f f c f f
bk d d d d d
c f c f f
 63
200 (1 )
d
bk d
 
𝑑𝑐 = 1/(1 + 𝑖𝑐), where 𝑖𝑐 is the consumers’ discount rate and 𝑑𝑐 is the consumers’ discount factor; 𝑑𝑓 = 1/(1 + 𝑖𝑓), where 𝑖𝑓 
is firm’s discount rate and 𝑑𝑓 is firm’s discount factor; CS I represents the competitive setting 1; profit, consumer surplus, and 
welfare corresponds to cohort of customers in period 0. 
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Table 4: Summary of Results for Competitive Settings II-IV (CS II-IV) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CSII
(0 1)  c fd d
 
CSII
( ) f cd d d
 
CSIII
(0 1)  c fd d
 
CSIII
( ) f cd d d
 
CSIV
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Durable 
price 2 (1 )
d
c
bk d
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d
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28 (1 ) (1 )
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 
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price k  k  
2 (1 )
(1 2 )

 
k d dc f
d d dc f f
 k  k  k  
Marginal 
consumer 
1
2
 
1
2
 0  0  0  0  
Profit 
4 (1 )
d
c
bk d
c
 4 (1 )
d
bk d
 0  0  0  0  
Consumer 
surplus 8 (1 )
dc
bk dc
 
8 (1 )
d
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2( (1 2 ) )
28 (1 ) (1 )
 
 
d d d
c f f
bk d d d
c f f
 2 (1 )
d
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2 (1 )
d
c
bk d
c
 2 (1 )
d
bk d
 
Welfare 
3
8 (1 )
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bk dc
 3
8 (1 )
d
bk d
 
2( (1 2 ) )
28 (1 ) (1 )
 
 
d d d
c f f
bk d d d
c f f
 2 (1 )
d
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2 (1 )
d
c
bk d
c
 2 (1 )
d
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𝑑𝑐 = 1/(1 + 𝑖𝑐), where 𝑖𝑐is the consumers’ discount rate and 𝑑𝑐 is the consumers’ discount factor; 𝑑𝑓 = 1/(1 + 𝑖𝑓), where 𝑖𝑓 is firm’s discount rate and 𝑑𝑓 is firm’s 
discount factor; CS II to CS IV represents the competitive settings 2 to 4; profit, consumer surplus, and welfare corresponds to cohort of customers in period 0; 
if customers do not commit to purchase in CS III, then the results are equal to those of CS IV. 
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Table 5: Summary of Results Across Competitive Settings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CS I CS I CS II CS III CS III CS IV 
Commitment  Firm 
commits 
Firm does 
not commit 
n/a Customers 
commit 
Customers do 
not commit 
n/a 
Durable price, F ●●●●● ●●●● ●●●●●● ● ●●● ●●● 
Consumable price, p ●●●●● ●●●●●● ●●● ●●●● ●●● ●●● 
Profit, π ●●●●●● ●●●●● ●●●● ●●● ●●● ●●● 
Consumer surplus, S ●●● ●● ● ●●●●●● ●●●●● ●●●●● 
Welfare, W ●●●●● ●●●● ● ●●●●●● ●●● ●●● 
CS: competitive setting; CS I: monopolist in durable market and tie-in between durable and consumable; CS II: 
monopolist in durable market and no tie-in between durable and consumable; CS III: competition in durable 
market and tie-in between durable and consumable; CS IV: competition in durable market and no tie-in between 
durable and consumable; n/a: not applicable; the number of dots denotes the “rank” (reverse rank) across 
competitive setting; six dots, ●●●●●●, denote the best rank (i.e., highest value) in each row; a lower number of 
dots denotes lower values; the number of dots cannot be compared across columns; 
Reading example: Consumer surplus is highest under CS III with commitment of customers (see Column (4)) so 
that this cell contains six dots. Consumer surplus is second-highest under CS III without commitment of 
consumers (Column (5)) and CS IV (Column (6)) so that these two cells receive five dots. The next highest 
consumer surplus (CS I with commitment of firm, Column (1)) takes the fourth “rank” and receives three dots. 
CS I without commitment of the firm (Column (2)) takes the fifth “rank” so that it receives two dots. CS II 
(Column (3)) takes the sixth “rank” and receives one dot. 
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Table 6: Summary of Effects of Higher Time Preference  
Effect of a higher 
consumers’ time 
preference on … 
CS I CS I CS II CS III CS III CS IV Overall 
effect 
Commitment  Firm 
commits 
Firm does 
not commit 
n/a Customers 
commit 
Customers do 
not commit 
n/a  
Durable price, F decrease 
(Prop. 1) 
decrease 
(Sec. 3.1.2) 
decrease 
(Prop. 4) 
decrease 
(Prop. 7) 
no effect 
(Sec. 4.2) 
no effect 
(Sec. 4.2) 
never 
increase 
Consumable price, p increase 
(Prop. 1) 
no effect 
(Sec. 3.1.2) 
no effect 
(Prop. 4) 
increase 
(Prop. 7) 
no effect 
(Sec. 4.2) 
no effect 
(Sec. 4.2) 
never 
decrease 
Profit, π decrease 
(Prop. 2) 
decrease 
(Prop. 3) 
decrease 
(Prop. 5) 
no effect 
(always zero) 
(Prop. 8) 
no effect 
(always zero) 
(Prop. 9) 
no effect 
(always zero) 
(Prop. 10) 
never 
increase 
Surplus, S decrease 
(Prop. 2) 
decrease 
(Prop. 3) 
decrease 
(Prop. 5) 
decrease 
(Prop. 8) 
decrease 
(Prop. 9) 
decrease 
(Prop. 10) 
always 
decrease 
Welfare, W decrease 
(Prop. 2) 
decrease 
(Prop. 3) 
decrease 
(Prop. 5) 
decrease 
(Prop. 8) 
decrease 
(Prop. 9) 
decrease 
(Prop. 10) 
always 
decrease 
Prop.: proposition; Sec.: section. 
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Figure 1: Effect of Increasing Time Preference of Consumers when the Firm Commits to its 
Prices (CS I) 
    
    
Values are are k = 0.5; K = 0; b = 1; df = 1 / (1 + if) = 0.9, i.e., if  = 1 / 9 = 11.11%; t = 0, 1, 2, …; , S, and W are 
profit, consumer surplus, and welfare realized from customers in period 0 respectively. Consumers’ discount factor 
is dc = 1 / (1+ic). Thus, dc = 1 if ic = 0; dc = 0.8 if ic = 0.25; dc = 0.5 if ic = 1.0. The x-scale starts at dc= 0.9 because 
consumers discount more strongly than the firm so that dc  df = 0.9. 
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Figure 2: Effect of Increasing Time Preference of Consumers when the Firm Does not 
Commit to its Prices (CS I) 
  
  
Values are are k = 0.5; K = 0; b = 1; df = 1 / (1 + if) = 0.9, i.e., if  = 1 / 9 = 11.11%; t = 0, 1, 2, …; , S, and W are 
profit, consumer surplus, and welfare realized from customers in period 0 respectively. Consumers’ discount factor 
is dc = 1 / (1+ic). Thus, dc = 1 if ic = 0; dc = 0.8 if ic = 0.25; dc = 0.5 if ic = 1.0. The x-scale starts at dc= 0.9 because 
consumers discount more strongly than the firm so that dc  df = 0.9. 
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